NDDB and dairy cooperative recruitment · India · National Dairy Development Board; state cooperative milk federations
Original practice questions written to the published syllabus · not past papersThe economics of milk production, processing and markets, cooperative organisation and how milk is priced. The agribusiness track (cooperatives-fpos, agricultural-marketing-price-analysis) covers the general theory.
In the exams: ICAR AIEEA-PG and AICE dairy economics option at NDRI (Agricultural/Livestock Economics); IBPS AFO professional knowledge (animal husbandry and dairy); NABARD dairy model projects
NDDB and dairy cooperative recruitment (India)
Anand pattern structure and governance; two-axis fat-SNF pricing and price charts; procurement economics, capacity utilisation and price spread; patronage bonus; Operation Flood history and evaluation; cooperative performance indicators.
How our questions for NDDB and dairy cooperative recruitment spread across the units of Dairy Economics, Cooperatives & Milk Pricing. Difficulty: 19 easy, 51 medium, 22 hard.
| Milk pricing: fat-SNF two-axis and component pricing | 12 | |
| Dairy cooperatives: principles, governance and performance | 12 | |
| Milk marketing orders, quotas and support schemes | 12 | |
| Dairy price risk: futures and forward contracts | 12 | |
| Dairy development programmes and their evaluation | 12 | |
| Economics of scale in milk processing | 11 | |
| World dairy trade and commodity price cycles | 11 | |
| Dairy market structure and price spread | 9 | |
| Financing dairy enterprises | 1 |
Choose an answer, then open the working. Each explanation says why the right answer is right and why the others are not.
Why does the optimum size of a milk processing plant depend on the milk-shed as well as on processing technology?
A. Assembly cost per litre rises as milk is collected from farther away
Processing cost per litre falls with size, but collecting more milk means longer routes and thinner supply, so assembly cost per litre rises. The best size minimises the sum of the two.
A plant's flush-season intake is 180,000 litres a day and lean-season intake 90,000 litres a day, each lasting half the year, against a capacity of 200,000 litres a day. What is its average capacity utilisation over the year?
B. 67.5 percent
Average intake = (180,000 + 90,000) ÷ 2 = 135,000 litres a day; utilisation = 135,000 ÷ 200,000 = 67.5 percent. 90 percent is the flush season alone, 45 percent the lean season alone, and 135 confuses the volume with a percentage.
Ten kilograms of milk at 6.0% fat and 9.0% SNF are paid on the two-axis system. A supplier adds one kilogram of water. What happens to the payment?
D. It is unchanged
Payment depends on kilograms of fat and SNF, which are unchanged at 0.6 kg and 0.9 kg; fat and SNF percentages fall to about 5.45% and 8.18%. Under per-litre pricing the watered milk would earn ten percent more, which is the reason solids-based payment is used.
Why do many component pricing systems include a negative value per litre of milk?
B. To charge for collecting and processing water
A volume deduction reflects the cost of hauling and handling water that has no value in the products, so the same solids in less water are worth more. Low fat is already paid less through the fat rate.
Thousands of farmers in a district can sell milk to only one buyer within reach. What market structure is this at the first stage?
B. Monopsony
A single buyer facing many sellers is a monopsony and can pay less than a competitive price. A monopoly is a single seller. Farmer-owned cooperatives are one response to monopsony.
A large retailer gains buying power over dairy processors in a city. Which effect does market structure analysis predict first?
B. Pressure on processors' margins
A powerful buyer can push down the prices it pays processors, squeezing their margins; processors may in turn try to pass pressure back to farmers. Higher farm prices or lower chilling costs do not follow from retailer power.
Studies of dairy cooperatives that failed after donor or state support ended most often point to which missing condition?
B. An assured outlet for members' milk in the flush season
Successful cooperatives such as those of the Anand pattern combine an assured market, quality payment, prompt payment, professional management and member control; without a market for flush milk, members turn elsewhere. Futures markets and banning vendors are not identified success factors.
Which condition was attached by law to the 2001 merger that created New Zealand's dominant dairy cooperative?
D. Supplying raw milk to independent processors
Because the merger created a dominant buyer, the Dairy Industry Restructuring Act required open entry and exit for farmers and the supply of set quantities of raw milk to independent processors, to keep competition possible.
Which evaluation design best answers whether a new dairy cooperative raised members' incomes, when villages cannot be randomised?
B. Difference-in-differences with comparable villages
Comparing the change in members' incomes with the change in comparable non-members over the same period removes fixed differences and common trends. A single post-project survey has no counterfactual, and enrolment and budget measure inputs.
Who guarantees the performance of a dairy futures contract?
A. The exchange's clearing house
The clearing house stands between buyer and seller and guarantees performance, supported by margins. That is what removes counterparty risk compared with a forward contract.
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