ICAR AICE-JRF/SRF (PhD admission and fellowship) · India · National Testing Agency for ICAR
Original practice questions written to the published syllabus · not past papersFarmer-owned businesses: cooperative principles and history, how cooperatives and producer companies are governed and managed, and the public programmes that promote producer organisations.
In the exams: agricultural master's entrance examinations, cooperation (heavy); agricultural economics PhD entrance and fellowship examinations (heavy); agribusiness management PhD entrance and fellowship examinations, producer organisations (present); agricultural development bank officer recruitment (heavy)
How our questions for ICAR AICE-JRF/SRF spread across the units of Cooperatives & Farmer Producer Organisations. Difficulty: 0 easy, 15 medium, 15 hard.
| Principles of cooperation | 8 | |
| The cooperative movement and the state | 4 | |
| Formation of producer organisations and producer companies | 4 | |
| Board and professional management of cooperatives | 3 | |
| Collective farming | 3 | |
| National cooperative federations | 2 | |
| Governance of producer organisations | 2 | |
| Public programmes to promote producer organisations: membership, management cost support, equity grants and credit guarantees | 2 | |
| Revitalisation and reform of cooperatives | 1 | |
| Single-window input supply and output marketing | 1 |
Choose an answer, then open the working. Each explanation says why the right answer is right and why the others are not.
Older members of a dairy cooperative vote against a plant expansion that will pay off in fifteen years, preferring higher milk prices now, because their claim on the cooperative ends when they stop supplying. In Cook's (1995) terms this is the:
D. Horizon problem
The horizon problem arises when a member's residual claim is shorter than the life of the asset, so members underinvest in long-term projects. The free-rider problem concerns new members or non-members enjoying benefits built by others; the portfolio problem concerns members being unable to match investment to their own risk preferences.
Dutch horticultural cooperatives are known for selling through the clock auction. In this auction the price:
B. Starts high and falls until the first buyer stops the clock
The clock auction is a descending-price (Dutch) auction: the first buyer to stop the clock buys at that price. An ascending open auction is the English type; sealed bids and fixed prices are different mechanisms.
Kenya rewrote its cooperative law in 1997 to cut state control, then amended it in 2004 after mismanagement appeared in some societies. What does this sequence most often illustrate?
C. That autonomy without member oversight and audit can let mismanagement grow
The lesson drawn widely is that autonomy needs internal checks: audit, informed members and accountable boards. It is not an argument for government management or for full reversal, and Kenya later placed deposit-taking SACCOs under a prudential regulator.
A village credit cooperative extends into fertiliser retail, grain storage and procurement. Which risk is most specific to this single-window expansion?
B. Losses in trading lines draining funds needed for credit, because working capital is shared
Multiple lines share one balance sheet, so stock losses or unsold inventory can impair the credit business; hence separate accounts and cost-covering prices for each line. The other options are not consequences of diversification.
Several countries have created hybrid legal forms for farmer businesses. Which description fits a producer company?
C. A company owned only by producers, with limited return on capital and patronage bonus
The producer company, introduced in Indian company law in 2002, keeps cooperative features (producer-only membership, democratic voting, limited return on capital, patronage bonus) inside company law. Its shares cannot be listed, and it is neither a state body nor a cooperative society with unlimited liability.
Dutch law lets a cooperative choose the liability of its members on dissolution. A 'UA' cooperative is one in which:
B. Members' liability for the cooperative's debts is excluded
Dutch cooperatives choose WA (unlimited), BA (limited) or UA (excluded) liability. Unlimited liability marked early Raiffeisen societies; a fixed cap is the BA form; directors' liability is a separate matter.
A critic argues that the equity grant design favours FPOs that are already well-off. Which feature of the grant supports that argument?
C. It is a matching grant, so organisations whose members can contribute more equity receive more grant
Because the grant matches member equity (up to a per-member and a per-organisation cap), organisations with poorer members who can raise little capital get less. The grant is not fixed, not a loan, and not limited to particular districts.
Further reading: Illustrative programme parameters stated in the question
China's household responsibility system from about 1978 is often cited in the collective farming literature because it:
C. Returned land use and residual income to households and was followed by rapid output growth
The communes (from 1958) were dismantled in favour of household contracting, which restored individual incentives; output rose sharply. It did not create communes, and state procurement was phased, not abolished at once.
Which reason is most consistently given in the literature for the poor performance of compulsory collective farms?
B. Weak individual incentives, because effort and reward are only loosely linked and monitoring is costly
When pay is shared across a large group and effort is hard to monitor, individuals shirk; incentive problems grow with group size. Collective farms were typically large and mechanised, so the land and machinery options are wrong.
Compared with a cooperative, which feature of a producer company makes it potentially more attractive to lenders?
D. It is governed by uniform company law with standard filings and less scope for registrar interference
Lenders value predictable governance and disclosure under company law. Producer company shares are not tradable on exchanges, members' liability is limited, and audit is required.
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